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Abstract
Marengo and the second author have developed in the last years
a geometric model of social choice when this takes place among bun-
dles of interdependent elements, showing that by bundling and un-
bundling the same set of constituent elements an authority has the
power of determining the social outcome. In this paper we will tie the
model above to tournament theory, solving some of the mathematical
problems arising in their work and opening new questions which are
interesting not only from a mathematical and a social choice point
of view, but also from an economic and a genetic one. In particular,
we will introduce the notion of u-local optima and we will study it
from both a theoretical and a numerical/probabilistic point of view;
we will also describe an algorithm that computes the universal basin
of attraction of a social outcome in O(M3 logM) time (where M is
the number of social outcomes).
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Introduction
In [3] Arrow created modern social choice theory, a rigorous melding of social
ethics and voting theory with an economic flavor. The central aim of social
choice theory is to analyze the aggregation of preferences. Assume there is
a society of n agents indexed by i = 1, . . . , m. Each agent has his own well-
behaved preference i over some space of possibilities (or social outcomes)X ,
i.e. a total order on the set X . Let P be the set of well-behaved preferences.
The element (1, . . . ,m) ∈ P
m is the profile of a society. The goal is to put
all of these preferences together to come up with a single system of social
preferences or social rule, i.e. a total order on the set X , to decide matters
of policy and to evaluate welfare. Namely, a social choice function (or social
decision rule)
R : Pm −→ P
is needed.
This social decision rule should fulfill the following properties.
Completeness and Transitivity With this economists means that so-
ciety can make a decision about any social outcome and can rank all
social outcomes. (Obviously, this property is intrinsic in the definition
of the function R.)
Paretianity If everyone unanimously prefers x to y then so should soci-
ety.
Universal Domain Property No matter what kind of wacky prefer-
ences people may have, so long as they are well-behaved, R has to be
able to deal with them. In other words there are no restrictions on the
profiles of preferences, i.e. on the elements in Pm.
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Whether or not society
prefers x to y does not depend on what people think of any other
irrelevant alternative z. This can be formally stated by saying that if
there are two profiles of individual preferences (1, . . . ,m) and (
′
1
, . . . ,′m) such that
x i y if and only if x 
′
i y,
then
x R(1, . . . ,m) y if and only if x R(
′
1, . . . ,
′
m) y.
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Nondictatorship An agent ai is said to be dictatorial if, for all x, y ∈
X , whenever ai prefers x to y society prefers x to y, i.e. R is the
projection on the i-th component. The social decision rule R is said to
be nondictatorial if it is not a projection map.
Arrow [3] proved that such a function does not exist. Therefore, in order to
overcome this problem, in social choice theory it is a customary convention
to drop the transitivity request.
Mathematicians and economists studied this problem during the last 50
years with different approaches. For example, tournament (and, in general,
graph) theory turned out to be strictly connected to voting and social choice
problems, since Landau started to study this subject [14, 15, 16]. In the works
of Eckmann [11], Eckmann, Ganea and Hilton [12], and Weinberger [29] there
has been an “unexpected application of algebraic topology to a different field
of intellectual enterprise,”1 i.e. the social choice theory. Topology is also
used to study social choice problems as, for instance, Chichilnisky [7, 8, 9]
and Baryshnikov [4] have done. Very recently, Saari [21, 22] used geometry to
analyze the matter of voting. Moreover, Terao [28] introduced an admissible
map of chambers of a real central arrangement which is a generalization of a
social welfare function.
Social choice theory usually assumes that agents are faced with a set of
exogenously given and mutually exclusive alternatives. These alternatives
are “simple”, in the sense that are one-dimensional objects or, even when
they are multidimensional, they are simply points in some portion of the
homogeneous Rn space and they lack an internal structure that limits the
set of possible alternatives.
Many choices in real life situations depart substantially from this simple
setting. Choices are often made among bundles of interdependent elements.
These bundles may be formed in a variety of ways, which in turn affect the
selection process of a social outcome. For instance, in the typical textbook
example of social choice, where a group of friends decides what to do for the
evening, the choice set is {movie, concert, restaurant, dinner at home,. . . }.
However, at a closer scrutiny, these alternatives are neither primitive nor
exogenously given, because they are labels for bundles of elements (e.g. with
whom, where, when,. . . ) and the preferences are unlikely to be expressed
before the labels get specified in their constituting elements. Moreover, a
member of the group could easily obtain a social outcome close to the one he
1Cited by B. Eckmann.
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or she prefers by carefully crafting the objects and possibly designing a new
set of objects. Other examples can be candidates and parties in political
elections (which stand for complex bundles of interdependent policies and
personality traits) or packages of policies on which committees and boards
are called upon to decide.
In [17] Marengo and the second author develop a model of social choice
among bundles of elements, which they call objects. They show that the
outcome of the social choice process is highly dependent on the way these
bundles are formed. By bundling and unbundling the same set of constituent
elements (they call this the object construction power) an authority may have
the power to determine the social outcome. The object construction power
is stronger than the agenda power (i.e. the power to decide the order on
which the social outcomes are decided on), traditionally studied in the liter-
ature (for instance, by McKelvey [18]). Moreover, in their approach, objects
decompose the computationally complex search space into quasi-separable
subspaces (see Simon [26]), simplifying the computational task and making
decisions possible. They also show that by appropriately designing objects
it is possible to break almost all intransitive cycles, which frequently charac-
terize social choice.
In order to formally analyze the properties of a social choice model with
object construction and achieve general results, they use geometric properties
of hyperplane arrangements and link them to graph theory by means of
Salvetti’s Complex. In this respect, the model of Marengo and the second
author is a novel contribution to the analysis of the relation between discrete
problems of social choice and their topological structure. It provides a bridge
between a geometrical representation and a topological one of a social choice
problem to create a more general framework in which the topological space
is manipulable through object construction.
A local study is strictly connected to the geometric structure of the hy-
perplane arrangement and to the “local” structure of the graph, while global
properties depend also on the whole graph. Therefore, in the search for global
properties also combinatorial and computational problems arise.
In this paper we tie the model described in [17] to tournament theory.
This new link allows us to get results and opens new problems. Tournaments
are relevant in many fields of science, so they have been greatly studied by
many mathematicians, between 1940 and 1970, and almost everything has
been done. We translate the voting and social choice problems, arising in [17],
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into new tournament-theory problems interesting for mathematicians too.
Moreover, modularity plays a fundamental role in many Natural Complex
Systems [30] and hence we believe that this model can be applied to other
fields of science, e.g. genetics (see Stadler [27]). We plan to go into this
subject in a subsequent paper.
In Section 1 we will recall some basic notions on Hyperplane Arrange-
ments, Salvetti’s Complex and Tournaments. In Section 2 we will give basic
notions on social rules, we will describe Marengo and the second author’s
model, and we will also recall their main results. In the last part of the sec-
tion we will define the notion of u-local optimum and (u-)deepness of a social
outcome. The former is a compromise between the notion of local optimum
and global optimum. In order to obtain a particular local optimum after the
voting process it is enough to have the power of deciding the status quo from
which the voting process starts. In contrast, u-local optima are character-
ized by the property of being obtainable after the voting process by means
of object construction power only. This is significant, because it may happen
that whoever has the object construction power does not have the power of
deciding the status quo from which the voting process starts. The deepness
and the u-deepness measure the length of voting processes.
In Section 3 we will give results that tie the model described in [17]
to tournament theory. This link will allow us to prove results in order to
compute the universal basin of attraction of a given social outcome (which
is a studied and open problem in economics).
In Section 4 we will start studying the problem of probability on tour-
naments with the extra module structure. We will compute the maximum
number of local optima that a given social rule can have and the probabil-
ity to have a given number of local optima in a two dimensional social rule.
This probability is related to the phenomenon (very important and studied in
economics) of the trade-off between decidability (i.e. the possibility of reach-
ing some social optimum in a feasible time) and non manipulability (i.e. the
convergence of the social decision process to a unique global outcome that
does not depend upon initial condition and agenda). Then it would be very
interesting to generalize this result to an n-dimensional space of features.
We will also define a function to measure the gain in using Marengo
and the second author’s model instead of the classical one by means of the
probabilities that a social outcome is an optimum in the two models.
In Sections 5 and 6 we will approach the far more difficult problem of un-
derstanding when a local optimum is an u-local or a global one. In the former
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section we will give an algorithm that computes the universal basin of attrac-
tion of a given social outcome in O(M3 logM) time, where M is the number
of social outcomes. We point out that this problem deals with both object
constructions and agendas. Since there could be infinitely many agendas,
the problem it is not finite a priori. It is not difficult to reduce the problem
to a finite one, but a simple brute-force algorithm would take far more than
exponential time. This algorithm has been implemented by the first author
who has written the computer program FOSoR [1]. In Section 6 we will give
numerical data obtained by means of the computer program FOSoRStat [2]
(created by first author) that computes statistics on the number of social
rules with a given number of (u-)local optima.
The last section is devoted to one example. It is treated in some detail
because it is the smallest in which all kinds of optima (local, u-local and
global) appear.
Acknowledgements The authors are grateful to Prof. Luigi Marengo for
his useful comments and corrections.
The first author is grateful to Antonio Caruso for his useful discussions
on and help for computer science problems during the beautiful period spent
at the Department of Mathematics in Lecce. He would also like to thank the
Department of Mathematics and Applications in Milano for the nice welcome.
1 Preliminaries
1.1 Hyperplane arrangements and Salvetti’s complex
In this section we will recall some basic notions from the theory of hyper-
planes arrangements. The interested reader is referred to, for instance, Orlik
and Terao [20] for a much more detailed and extended study.
Hyperplane arrangements In geometry and combinatorics, an arrange-
ment of hyperplanes is a finite set A of hyperplanes in a linear, affine, or
projective space S. The cardinality |A| of the arrangement A is the number
of hyperplanes in A.
One is normally interested both in the real and in the complex case, hence
let K be either R or C and let V be either Rn or Cn. Thus, given the canonical
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base {e1, . . . , en} in V , each hyperplane H ∈ A is the kernel of a degree-1
polynomial αH ∈ K[x1, . . . , xn], defined up to a constant. The product
Q(A) =
∏
H∈A
αH
is called a defining polynomial of A.
If B is a subset of A, it is called a subarrangement of A. The intersection
semilattice of A, denoted by L(A), is the set of all non-empty intersections
of elements of A, i.e.
L(A) =
{⋂
H∈BH | B ⊆ A
}
.
These subspaces are called the flats of A. The set L(A) is partially ordered
by reverse inclusion.
The complement of A is defined as
M(A) = V \
⋃
H∈A
H.
The complement of an arrangement A in Rn is clearly disconnected. It is
made up of separate pieces called chambers or regions, each of which may be
either bounded or unbounded.
Each flat of A is also divided into sections by the hyperplanes that do not
contain the flat; these sections are called the faces of A. Chambers are faces
because the whole space is a flat. The faces of codimension 1 may be called
the facets of A. The face semilattice of an arrangement is the set of all faces,
ordered by inclusion. The arrangement A said to be essential if the minimal
dimensional flats are points (that we call vertices of the arrangement).
Every arrangement AR in Rn also generates an arrangement over C. Let
Q(AR) =
∏
H∈AR
αH be the defining (real) polynomial of AR in Rn. The
C-extended arrangement AC is the arrangement in Cn that consists of the
hyperplanes that are the kernel of the polynomials αH in Cn (instead of Rn).
The arrangement AC is also called the complexification of AR.
Salvetti’s complex As shown in [25], if the arrangement AC is the com-
plexification of a real one AR, there is a regular CW-complex S(AR) having
the homotopy type of the complement M(AC). We recall here briefly the
construction of this complex, which is called Salvetti’s complex.
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Let AR = {HR} be an essential finite affine hyperplane arrangement in
Rn. Let M(AC) = Cn \
⋃
HR∈AR
HC be the complement to the complexified
arrangement. The CW-complex S(AR) can be characterized as follows. Let
S := {F k} be the stratification of Rn into facets F k that is induced by the
arrangement [5], where the exponent k stands for codimension. Then S has
a standard partial ordering defined by
F i <S F
j if clos(F i) ⊃ F j
where clos(F i) is the closure of F i.
The k-cells of S(AR) bijectively correspond to the pairs [C <S F
k], where
C is a chamber of S. A k-cell [C <S F
k] is in the boundary of a j-cell
[D <S G
j ], with k < j, if
• F k <S G
j,
• the chambers C and D are contained in the same chamber of the sub-
arrangement
{HR ∈ AR | F ⊂ HR}.
The previous conditions are equivalent to saying that C is the chamber of
AR “closest” to D among those containing F
k in their closure.
It is possible to realize S(AR) inside Cn with explicitly given attaching
maps of the cells (see [25]).
1.2 Graphs and tournaments
We will give here a short summary of graph theory to fix notation. For a
complete discussion we refer the reader to Chartrand and Lesniak [6] and
Moon [19].
Graphs We will only take oriented simple graphs into account. Hence,
throughout the paper, a graph will be a pair (V, E), where V is the set of
nodes and E is the set of arcs, such that each pair of nodes {p, q} is connected
by at most one arc (either −→pq or ←−pq). If the arc −→pq (or ←−qp) is in E , the node
p is said to dominate q. A sub-graph of (V, E) is a graph (V ′, E ′) such that
V ′ ⊂ V and E ′ ⊂ E .
A path P (p, q) from p to q is a sequence of arcs of the type−→pp1,
−−→p1p2, . . . ,
−→pkq.
A domination path DP (p, q) from p to q is a sequence of arcs of the type
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Figure 1: The condensation of a tournament.
←−pp1,
←−−p1p2, . . . ,
←−pkq. A cycle P (p, p) (resp. a domination cycle DP (p, p)) is a
path (resp. a domination path) from p to itself. The length of a (domination)
path is the number of arcs it contains; a cycle of length k is called k-cycle.
Tournaments A tournament is a complete graph (i.e. each pair of nodes
{p, q} is connected by an arc). By T we will always denote a tournament with
M nodes. A sub-tournament of T is a sub-graph of T that is a tournament.
A tournament is said to be reducible if it is possible to partition its nodes
into two non-empty subsets V1 and V2 in such a way that all the nodes
in V1 dominate all the nodes in V2; otherwise it is called irreducible. A
tournament is irreducible if and only if each pair of nodes is contained in a
cycle. There is no bound on the length of the cycle, but every node of an
irreducible tournament is contained in a k-cycle for all k = 3, 4, . . . ,M . In
particular, any irreducible tournament contains a hamiltonian cycle. A path
is hamiltonian if it passes through all nodes. A tournament is transitive if
it contains no cycle. Every tournament contains a hamiltonian path; if the
tournament is transitive the hamiltonian path is unique.
An irreducible component Ti of T is a maximal irreducible sub-tournament
of T . The nodes of these irreducible components form a partition of the
nodes of T . Moreover, all the nodes of a component Ti either dominate or
are dominated by all the nodes of another component Tj . The transitive
tournament T˜ whose nodes are the irreducible components of T and whose
arcs are deduced by any arc between the two irreducible components (see
Figure 1) is called the condensation of T . Without lack of generality, we will
choose the subscripts so that if i > j then Ti dominates Tj . The maximal
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component of T will be denoted by TMAX.
Score The number of nodes dominated by a node p is called the score of
p. The sequence of the scores of the the nodes of a tournament is called
the score sequence of T . Up to a relabeling of the nodes, we can suppose
that the score sequence of T is non-decreasing. A tournament is transitive if
and only if its score sequence is 0, 1, . . . ,M − 1. A non-decreasing sequence
s1, s2, . . . , sM of nonnegative integers is the score sequence of a tournament
if and only if
∑k
i=1 si >
(
k
2
)
for each k < M and
∑M
i=1 si =
(
M
2
)
hold. A
tournament is irreducible if and only if all the M − 1 inequalities above are
strict.
In order to find the irreducible components (and hence the condensation)
of T , the following very simple algorithm, having complexity O(M2), can be
applied.
1. Find the smallest k such that
∑k
i=1 si =
(
k
2
)
; the sub-tournament T1
made up of the k nodes with smallest score is an irreducible component
of T .
2. Remove T1 from T and repeat Step 1 until no node is left.
Note that if the aim is to find the maximal component TMAX, one can start
“from above” and take into account M −1− si instead of si (i.e. the number
of nodes that dominate the i-th node), so that only one step is needed. An-
other algorithm finding the irreducible components of any graph and having
complexity O(M2) is shown in Kocay and Kreher [13].
Cycles A measure of how far a tournament is from being transitive is the
number of 3-cycles. If the score sequence of T is s1, s2, . . . , sM , then the
number of 3-cycles is at most
(
M
3
)
−
∑M
i=1
(
si
2
)
6
{
M3−M
24
if 2 ∤ M
M3−4M
24
if 2 | M
. If T
is irreducible, the 3-cycles are at least M − 2.
Number of tournaments The number of tournaments withM nodes (up
to relabeling) is T (M) =
∑
(d)
2D
N
, where
• (d) = (d1, d2, . . . , dM) is multi-index with d2i = 0, d2i+1 ≥ 0 and
∑M
i=1 i·
di = M ,
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M T (M) M T (M) M T (M)
1 1 5 12 9 191536
2 1 6 56 10 9733056
3 2 7 456 11 903753248
4 4 8 6880 12 154108311168
Table 1: The number of tournaments.
M P (M) M P (M) M P (M) M P (M)
1 1 5 0.53125 9 0.931702 13 0.993671
2 0 6 0.681152 10 0.961589 14 0.996587
3 0.25 7 0.799889 11 0.978720 15 0.998171
4 0.375 8 0.881115 12 0.988343 16 0.999024
Table 2: The probability that a tournament is irreducible.
• D is 1
2
(∑M
i,j=1 didj gcd(i, j)−
∑M
i=1 di
)
,
• N is
∏M
i=1 i
didi!.
The values of T (M) forM 6 12 are given in Table 1. AsM tends to infinity,
T (M)→∞ and T (M) ∼
2(
M
2 )
M !
hold.
The probability P (M) that a tournament with M nodes is irreducible
can be computed recursively by the formula
P (M) = 1−
M−1∑
i=1
(
M
i
)
P (i)
2t(M−t)
.
The values of P (M) forM 6 16 are given in Table 2. AsM tends to infinity,
P (M)→ 1 and P (M) ∼ 1−
M
2M−2
hold.
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2 Definitions and structure of the model
Social decision rules Consider a population of ν agents. Each agent i is
characterized by a system of transitive preferences i over the set of social
outcomes X . The set of systems of transitive preferences  is denoted by P.
A social decision rule R is a function:
R : Pν −→ P
(1, . . . ,ν) 7−→ R(1,...,ν)
which determines a system of social preferences or social rule R(1,...,ν)
from the preferences of ν individual agents. With P we denote the set of
systems of (non-necessarily transitive) social preferences; as a matter of fact,
we note that the social rule R(1,...,ν) is not, in general, transitive anymore.
If ∆ is the diagonal of the cartesian product X ×X , the element R∈ P
defines a subset
Y1,R = {(x, y) ∈ X ×X \∆ | x R y}
and the set of relevant social outcomes
Y0,R = {x ∈ X | ∃y ∈ X such that (x, y) ∈ Y1,R or (y, x) ∈ Y1,R}.
If Y0,R is the whole X , the social rule is said to be complete. A complete
social rule is said to be strict if for each pair of social outcomes x and y the two
conditions x R y and y R x are mutually exclusive (i.e. either the social
outcome x is preferred to the social outcome y or the converse holds). For the
sake of simplicity, we will consider only strict social rules. This restriction is
almost always unnecessary, but it simplifies both the investigation and the
presentation. Therefore, from now on, ≻ will always denote a complete strict
social rule; unless explicitly stated, it will be considered as fixed. For the
sake of shortness, we will always drop the words “complete” and “strict”.
The graph The sets Y0,≻ and Y1,≻ are, respectively, the sets of nodes and
arcs of a graph Y≻. Two nodes x and y in Y0,≻ are connected by an arc if
(x, y) ∈ Y1,≻ or (y, x) ∈ Y1,≻; the orientation is from x to y in the former
case and from y to x in the latter. For the sake of simplicity, we will use the
same symbol x for the nodes of Y≻ and (x, y) for its arcs. We decided to use
different notations for graphs in regard of the relevance of different theories.
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Note that the completeness assumption on social rules guarantees that the
graph Y≻ is connected.
A cycle
(x1, x2), (x2, x3), . . . , (xh, x1)
in the graph Y≻ corresponds to a cycle a` la Condorcet-Arrow [10], i.e. to the
sequence
x1 ≻ x2 ≻ · · · ≻ xh ≻ x1.
Features Let F = {f1, . . . , fn} be a bundle of elements, said features, the
i-th of which takes mi values, i.e. fi ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , mi − 1} with i = 1, . . . , n.
Denote by m = (m1, . . . , mn) the multi-index of the numbers of values of the
features. From now on, a social outcome (or configuration) will be an n-uple
(v1, . . . , vn) of values such that 0 6 vi < mi. For the sake of shortness, it will
be also denoted by v1 · · · vn. The set of all social outcomes will be denoted
by X . The cardinality of X is
∏n
i=1mi and will be denoted by M .
The hyperplane arrangement There is a correspondence [17] between
the setX of social outcomes and the set C of the chambers of the arrangement
An,m =
{
Hi,j | αHi,j = λi − j
}
16i6n
06j<mi−1
.
Namely, x = v1 · · · vn corresponds to the chamber C that contains the open
set
{(λ1, . . . , λn) ∈ R
n | vj − 1 < λj < vj, j = 1, . . . , n} .
Salvetti’s complex There is a correspondence [17] between the oriented
graph Y≻ and a subcomplex of the 1-skeleton of Salvetti’s complex S(An,m) as
follows. Namely, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the 0-skeleton
S0(An,m) and the set of chambers in An,m, i.e. the set of social outcomes X
by means of the correspondence above. The generators of the 1-skeleton can
be described as
S1(An,m) = {(x, y) ∈ X ×X \∆ | x and y are adjacent}
where two chambers C and D are said to be adjacent if they are separated
by only one hyperplane.
Given a subset of consecutive elements
{(x1, x2), (x2, x3), . . . , (xk−2, xk−1), (xk−1, xk)}
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in S1(An,m) their formal sum is
(x1, xk) =
k−1∑
j=1
(xj , xj+1).
It follows that given a social rule ≻ any arc (x, y) ∈ Y1,≻ can be written as a
formal sum of a minimal number of consecutive elements in S1(An,m). The
number of elements is exactly the number of hyperplanes that separate the
two social outcomes x, y ∈ X .
Let (x, y) ∈ Y1,≻ be an arc given by a formal sum with coefficients 1 of
arcs that are in Y1,≻. If the social rule is transitive the arc can be deleted,
because it can be reconstructed by means of the other arcs.
Remark 2.1. Saari has greatly contributed to establishing general geometric
representations of voting models and voting paradoxes [21, 23, 24]. Salvetti’s
complex is a CW-complex in Cn, but it has an underlying real structure
which is a purely simplicial complex. Moreover, vertices in this complex can
be freely chosen inside each chamber. This structure can be used in order to
recast and generalize some existing geometric models of voting such as those
provided by Saari.
Objects schemes Given a non-empty subset I ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, the object AI
is the subset
AI = {Hi,j} i∈I
06j<mi−1
of the arrangement An,m. The cardinality of AI is called size of the object
AI and is denoted by |AI |. The complement of a set I in {1, . . . , n} will
be denoted (as usual) by Ic, hence the complement AcI = An,m \ AI of the
arrangement AI in An,m turns out to equal AIc. The object instantiation
x(AI) of a social outcome x is the chamber of the subarrangement AI that
contains the chamber corresponding to x.
An objects scheme is a set of objects A = {AI1, . . . ,AIk} such that⋃k
j=1 Ij = {1, . . . , n}. Note that the sets Ij may have non-empty intersection.
The size of an objects scheme is the size of its largest object,
|A| = max{|AI1|, . . . , |AIk|}.
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Neighbors of a social outcome Let be given an objects scheme A =
{AI1, . . . ,AIk}. A social outcome y is said to be a preferred neighbor of a
social outcome x with respect to an object AIh ∈ A if the following conditions
hold:
1) y ≻ x,
2) y(AIc
h
) = x(AIc
h
), i.e. x and y belong to the same chamber of the arrange-
ment AIc
h
,
3) y(AIh) 6= x(AIh), i.e. x and y belong to different chambers of the arrange-
ment AIh.
Note that Condition 3 is a direct consequence of the first two, but we have left
it for the sake of consistency with the non-strict case. The set of all preferred
neighbors of the social outcome x with respect to AIh ∈ A is denoted by
Φ(x,AIh). The set of all preferred neighbors of the social outcome x is
denoted by Φ(x,A) =
⋃k
j=1Φ(x,AIj).
A social outcome y ∈ Φ(x,AIh) is said to be a best neighbor of a social
outcome x with respect to an object AIh ∈ A if
y ≻ w ∀w ∈ Φ(x,AIh).
The set of all best neighbors of the social outcome x with respect to AIh ∈ A
is denoted by B(x,AIh).
Remark 2.2. Obviously, B(x,AIh) ⊆ Φ(x,AIh) holds. Moreover, either
B(x,AIh) is empty, or B(x,AIh) contains one social outcome only. Even if
this notation seems to be useless, we use it to follow the literature-customary
convention; indeed, if one takes also non-strict social rules into account, the
set B(x,AIh) may contain more than one social outcome.
The set of all best neighbors of the social outcome x is denoted by
B(x,A) =
⋃k
j=1B(x,AIj).
A domination path DP (x, y, A) through A, starting from x and ending in
y, is a sequence of best neighbors with respect to objects in A, i.e. a sequence
x = x0 ≺ x1 ≺ · · · ≺ xs = y
such that there exist objects AIh1 , . . . ,AIhs ∈ A with xi ∈ B(xi−1,AIhi ) for
all 1 6 i 6 s.
A social outcome y is said to be reachable from x with respect to an objects
scheme A if there exists a domination path DP (x, y, A). A social outcome x
is said to be a local optimum for A if Φ(x,A) is empty.
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Agenda Let A = {AI1, . . . ,AIk} be an objects scheme. An agenda α of A
is an ordered t-uple of indices (h1, . . . , ht) with t ≥ k such that {h1, . . . , ht} =
{1, . . . , k}. An agenda α states the order in which the objects AIi are decided
upon. In the model of [17] the agenda is repeated over and over again until
either a local optimum or a domination cycle is reached. The ordered t-uple
of objects (AIh1 , . . . ,AIht) is denoted by Aα. The set of all possible agendas
of A is denoted by Λ(A).
Let α = (h1, . . . , ht) be an agenda. A domination path
x0 ≺ x1 ≺ · · · ≺ xs
is said to be ordered along α if
xi ∈ B(xi−1,AIhq+1)
where hq is the remainder of the division of i − 1 by t. Such a domination
path will be denoted by DP (x0, xs, Aα).
A domination path is said to be maximal if it ends in either a local
optimum or a limit domination cycle. More precisely, either xs is a local
optimum or xs−t belongs to B(xs,AIhs+1), where hs is the remainder of the
division of s− 1 by t. Note that in the first case we do not require that xs−1
is different from xs, so there is no control on the number of times that xs
appears at the end of the domination path. Also in the second case, there is
no control on the number of times that the domination cycle
xs−t ≺ · · · ≺ xs
appears at the end of the domination path. In the first case, we will say that
the domination path ends up in xs.
Basin of attraction The basin of attraction Ψ(x,A) of a social outcome
x with respect to an objects scheme A is the set of the social outcomes y such
that there exists a maximal domination path DP (y, x, A) that ends up in x.
Remark 2.3. Note that Ψ(x,A) is empty if and only if x is not a local
optimum for A.
The ordered basin of attraction Ψ(x,Aα) of x with respect to an agenda
α of A is the set of the social outcomes y such that there exists a maximal
domination path DP (y, x, Aα) that ends up in x. Clearly, we have
Ψ(x,A) =
⋃
α∈Λ(A)
Ψ(x,Aα).
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Global optima A social outcome z ∈ X is said to be a global optimum for
an agenda α if Ψ(z, Aα) = X holds. It is said to be a global optimum for the
objects scheme A if and only if Ψ(z, Aα) = X holds for all agendas α ∈ Λ(A),
i.e. it is a global optimum for all the agendas of A.
Local and global optima strictly depend on the choice of the objects
scheme A. In [17] the authors prove that object construction power is, in
some sense, stronger than agenda power, i.e. they prove
Ψ(z, A) 6= ∅ ⇐⇒ Ψ(z, Aα) 6= ∅ for all α ∈ Λ(A).
Separating hyperplanes and distance between social outcomes Let
x and y be two social outcomes. They are said to be separated by an hyper-
plane H ∈ An,m if H separates the chambers Cx and Cy. In this case, the
notation x | H | y will be used. Moreover, x and y are said to be prominently
separated if there exist two hyperplanes Hi1,j1, Hi2,j2 ∈ An,m with i1 6= i2
(i.e. non-parallel) such that x | Hi1,j1 | y and x | Hi2,j2 | y hold. We will say
that x and y are separated by the feature f if the value of the feature f of y
differs from that of the feature f of x. The set of the features that separates
x and y is denoted by Hx,y.
The distance between x and y is the minimum number of hyperplanes
that separate x and y. The prominent distance dp(x, y) is the number of
features that separate x and y, i.e. #Hx,y. Note that dp(x, y) equals the
minimum number of hyperplanes that prominently separate x and y.
Recall that, by definition, if Hi,¯ belongs to the object AI for some ¯, then
Hi,j belongs to AI for all 0 6 j < mi − 1. Therefore, the subarrangement
Hx,y =
{
Hi,j ∈ An,m | i ∈ Hx,y, 0 6 j < mi − 1
}
of An,m has been considered. Note that, if we have dp(x, y) = 1 and d(x, y) >
1, all the hyperplanes in Hx,y are parallel.
Remark 2.4. The sets Hx,y and Hx,y are strictly interconnected. For in-
stance, we will use the fact that Hx,y is contained in Hz,w if and only if Hx,y
is contained in Hz,w.
In [17] the authors prove the following result.
Theorem 2.5. Let z be a social outcome. Then, there exists an objects
scheme Az for which z is a local optimum if and only if the inequality
dp(w, z) > 1 holds for any social outcome w with w ≻ z.
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The previous theorem explains also the reason of the choice of the name
“local optimum”. Namely, a social outcome z is a local optimum for an
objects scheme A if and only if any social outcome x such that dp(x, z) = 1
belongs to Ψ(z, A).
A social outcome z is said to be free if and only if the inequality dp(w, z) >
1 holds for any social outcome w with w ≻ z. Thus, by means of Theorem 2.5,
we have that z is a local optimum for an objects scheme Az if and only if z
is free.
Problem 2.6. An interesting question, pointed out in [17], is to under-
stand when a local optimum z for an objects scheme A is a global optimum,
i.e. when there exists an agenda α of A such that the basin of attraction
Ψ(z, Aα) is the whole X and when this is true for all agendas α ∈ Λ(A).
In [17] the authors prove the following.
Theorem 2.7. Let z be a free social outcome. Then, there exists an ob-
jects scheme Az such that Φ(z, Az) = ∅ and Φ(x,Az) 6= ∅ for all free social
outcomes x if and only if the condition
∃y ≻ x such that Hw,z * Hx,y ∀w ≻ z (1)
holds for all free x.
The equivalent conditions on the free social outcome z above are necessary
for z to be a global optimum.
Universal basin of attraction and u-local optima Let Π(An,m) be the
set of all possible objects schemes in An,m. The universal basin of attraction
of a social outcome z ∈ X is the set
Ψ(z) =
⋃
A∈Π(An,m)
Ψ(z, A),
i.e. the set of all the social outcomes x such that there exists an objects scheme
through which there is a domination path starting from x and ending up in
z.
By virtue of Remark 2.3 and Theorem 2.5, the universal basin of attrac-
tion of the social outcome z is non-empty if and only if z is free.
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Definition 2.8. A social outcome z is said to be an u-local optimum if its
universal basin of attraction Ψ(z) is the whole set of social outcomes X .
Remark 2.9. A global optimum is necessarily an u-local optimum, and
an u-local optimum is necessarily a local optimum for at least one objects
scheme.
Let x and z be social outcomes. In [17], when z is free, the authors
consider the set
Gzx = {y ≻ x | Hw,z * Hx,y ∀w ≻ z and B(x,Hx,y) 6= ∅}
and prove that if x is in the universal basin of attraction of z then Gzx 6= ∅.
For the sake of completeness, we will define Gzx to be ∅ if z is not free.
Remark 2.10. Suppose z is free. The set Gzx is non-empty if and only if
there exists an objects scheme Az such that Φ(z, Az) = ∅ and Φ(x,Az) 6= ∅
hold; i.e. if and only if x satisfies Condition (1) of Theorem 2.7.
Suppose now that x is a social outcome such that Gzx is non-empty (so z
is free). If B(x,Hx,y) is non-empty, its cardinality is one. The only element
of B(x,Hx,y) will be denoted by bx,y. In [17] the authors consider the set
BGzx = {bx,y | y ∈ G
z
x} ⊆ G
z
x,
the sets
Ez0 = {z},
Ez1 = {x ∈ X \ {z} | z ∈ BG
z
x},
Ez2 = {x ∈ X \ ∪
1
i=0E
z
i | E
z
1 ∩ BG
z
x 6= ∅},
...
Ezh = {x ∈ X \ ∪
h−1
i=0E
z
i | E
z
h−1 ∩ BG
z
x 6= ∅},
Ezh+1 = {x ∈ X \ ∪
h
i=0E
z
i | E
z
h ∩ BG
z
x 6= ∅} = ∅
(where h is the smallest integer such that Ezh+1 is empty), and the set
Ez =
h⋃
i=1
Ezi .
For the sake of completeness, we define all these sets to be empty if z is not
free. They prove the following theorem.
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Theorem 2.11. Let x and z be two social outcomes. Then x is in the
universal basin of attraction Ψ(z) if and only if x belongs to Ez, i.e.
Ψ(z) = Ez.
Definition 2.12. Let z be a social outcome. The deepness of a social out-
come x with respect to z is
• d if x belong to Ezd ,
• ∞ if x does not belong to Ψ(z).
Note that this definition makes sense because the Ez∗ ’s form a partition
of the universal basin of attraction of z.
Proposition 2.13. The deepness of a social outcome x with respect to z is
the minimum of the lengths of all maximal domination paths DP (x, z, Az),
among all objects schemes Az such that Φ(z, Az) is empty.
Proof. Let d be the deepness of the social outcome x with respect to z
and let h be the minimum of the lengths of all maximal domination paths
DP (x, z, Az), among all objects schemes Az such that Φ(z, Az) is empty. If
d is ∞, by virtue of Theorem 2.11, there is no maximal domination path
DP (x, z, Az), where Az is an objects scheme such that Φ(z, Az) is empty,
and hence h is ∞.
If d is not ∞, we can construct a maximal domination path
x = xd ≺ xd−1 ≺ · · · ≺ x1 ≺ x0 = z
such that xj belongs to E
z
j ∩ BG
z
xj+1
for j = 0, . . . , d− 1 and hence we have
h ≤ d. Let DP (x, z, Az) be a maximal domination path
x = xh ≺ xh−1 ≺ · · · ≺ x1 ≺ x0 = z
of length h. If AIj is the object of Az such that xj−1 belongs to B(xj ,AIj),
we have Hxj ,xj−1 ⊆ AIj and xj−1 ∈ E
z
j−1 ∩BG
z
xj
. Thus, x belongs to Ez and
hence to some Ezk with k ≤ h. Since the deepness of x is d, we have k = d,
and then
d = k ≤ h ≤ d.
The proof is complete.
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Figure 2: A social rule with no (u-)local optimum.
Definition 2.14. The u-deepness of a social outcome z is
• the maximum integer h such that Ezh is not empty,
• −∞ if all Ezh’s are empty.
Note that the u-deepness of a social outcome z is −∞ if and only if z is
not free.
3 Theoretical results
In this section we will give results that ties the model described in [17] with
tournament theory. From now on, we will denote by Ti’s the irreducible
components of the graph Y≻, with TMAX being the maximal component.
Proposition 3.1. If a social outcome x ∈ Ti is in the universal basin of
attraction Ψ(z) of a social outcome z ∈ Tj, then i 6 j holds.
Proof. Since x belongs to Ψ(z), there exists an objects scheme A, an agenda
α and a maximal domination path DP (x, z, Aα),
x = x0 ≺ x1 ≺ · · · ≺ xs = z,
ending up in z. Two cases may occur: either x ≻ z or x ≺ z. In the former
case, there exists a domination cycle γ that contains x and z, i.e. we have
i = j. In the latter case, we have i 6 j. This concludes the proof.
Corollary 3.2. Each u-local optimum belongs to TMAX.
Remark 3.3. The converse of the above corollary is not true. For instance,
the social rule whose graph is shown in Figure 2 has only one irreducible
component and no u-local optimum.
Moreover, for a social outcome z the property of being a local optimum for
an objects scheme (and agenda) and the property of belonging to TMAX are
not related to each other. The social rule whose graph is shown in Figure 2
has no local optimum, while that shown in Figure 3, for the objects scheme
{{H1}, {H2}}, has a local optimum, 00, which is not in TMAX = {11}.
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Figure 3: A social rule with a local optimum, 00, which is not in TMAX = {11}.
Proposition 3.4. A social outcome z ∈ X is a local optimum for all objects
schemes if and only if z is the only element in TMAX.
Proof. If z ∈ X is a local optimum for all objects schemes, in particular it
is a local optimum for A = {An,m}. Then, we have B(z,An,m) = ∅, i.e. we
have z ≻ x for all x ∈ X \ {z} and hence z is the only social outcome in
TMAX. The converse is obvious.
Definition 3.5. Let x ∈ Ti be a social outcome. We say that x is lifting
with respect to an objects scheme A if there is an object A ∈ A such that the
best neighbor y ∈ B(x,A) belongs to a component Tj such that j > i.
By definition, in TMAX there are no lifting social outcomes. Indeed, social
outcomes that are lifting with respect the objects scheme A arise when an arc
in a domination path through A has the endpoints in two different irreducible
components. In the following theorem we will give an equivalent condition
for a social outcome x ∈ X to be lifting.
Theorem 3.6. A social outcome x in an irreducible component Ti is lifting
for at least an objects scheme A if and only if there exists a social outcome
y ∈ Tj with j > i such that the following condition holds:
Hw,y * Hx,y ∀w ∈ X such that w ≻ y.
Proof. Let x ∈ Ti be a lifting social outcome for an objects scheme A. Then,
there exists y ∈ Tj with j > i such that B(x,A) = {y} for an object A ∈ A.
By construction, we have Hx,y ⊆ A. Suppose by contradiction that there
exists a social outcome w ≻ y such that Hw,y ⊆ Hx,y. We have Hw,y ⊆ A, so
y cannot belong to B(x,A), a contradiction.
Conversely, let y ∈ Tj , with j > i, be a social outcome such that Hw,y *
Hx,y for all w ≻ y. Then, we have y ≻ x. Moreover, for each social outcome
w ≻ y we have w(Hcx,y) 6= y(H
c
x,y), i.e. w is a neighbor neither of x nor of y
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with respect to Hx,y. Therefore, we obtain B(x,Hx,y) = {y} and hence the
thesis.
Until the end of this section, we fix a social outcome z, which will be
a candidate for being an u-local optimum. We give the following necessary
conditions on the irreducible components Ti of the graph Y≺ in order for z
to be an u-local optimum.
Proposition 3.7. If z is an u-local optimum, the following statements hold.
(i) For each social outcome x ∈ Ti, with Ti 6= TMAX, there exist an ob-
jects scheme Ax such that Φ(z, Ax) is empty and a domination path
DP (x, y, Ax) to a social outcome y ∈ Ti lifting with respect to Ax.
(ii) For each social outcome x ∈ Ti, with Ti 6= TMAX, every domination path
DP (x, z, A) through an objects scheme A such that Φ(z, A) is empty
contains a social outcome y ∈ Ti lifting with respect to A.
(iii) Each Ti different from TMAX contains a lifting social outcome with re-
spect to an objects scheme A such that Φ(z, A) is empty.
Proof. Let us prove Point (i). Let x be a social outcome belonging to Ti,
with Ti 6= TMAX. Since x belongs to Ψ(z), there exist an objects scheme A
such that Φ(z, A) is empty and a maximal domination path DP (x, z, A),
x = x0 ≺ x1 ≺ · · · ≺ xs = z,
ending up in z. For j = 0, . . . , s, let us define the integer ij such that xj
belongs to Tij . These integers are ordered non decreasingly and i0 differs
from is. Therefore, there exists a maximal one (say ¯) different from s and
such that i¯ = i0 and i¯+1 6= i0 hold. The social outcome y = x¯ belongs to
Ti and is lifting with respect to A, so the domination path
x = x0 ≺ x1 ≺ · · · ≺ x¯ = y,
is the path we are looking for.
A proof of Point (ii) is very similar to that of Point (i), so we leave it to
the reader. Point (iii) is a direct consequence of Point (i).
Proposition 3.8. Suppose that there is an irreducible component Ti 6= TMAX
such that for each x ∈ Ti we have G
z
x ⊆ Ti (or equivalently BG
z
x ⊆ Ti). Then
z is not an u-local optimum.
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Proof. Suppose by contradiction that z ∈ X is an u-local optimum. Let
x be a social outcome that belongs to Ti. By means of Theorem 2.11, we
obtain an objects scheme A such that Φ(z, A) is empty and a domination
path DP (x, z, A),
x = x0 ≺ x1 ≺ · · · ≺ xs ≺ xs+1 = z,
where xj belongs to E
z for each j = 0, . . . , s+1, i.e. xj+1 belongs to BG
z
xj
for
each j = 0, . . . , s. By virtue of Proposition 3.7-(ii), there exists ¯ ∈ {0, . . . , s}
such that x¯ belongs to Ti and is lifting with respect to A, a contradiction to
the hypothesis.
We will denote by
Szi = {x ∈ Ti | G
z
x ⊆ Ti}
the set of the social outcomes of the irreducible component Ti that are not
lifting with respect to any objects scheme A such that Φ(z, A) is empty.
Therefore, the proposition above can be restated as follows.
Proposition 3.8. If z is an u-local optimum, then Szi 6= Ti holds for all
Ti 6= TMAX.
For each irreducible component Ti, we will now construct a particular
sub-graph of Ti. It will give information on the possible domination paths
through an objects scheme, starting from a social outcome of Ti and ending
up in z. The nodes of this graph are the social outcomes in Ti; if x and y
are social outcomes, there is an arc from x to y if y ∈ BGzx. Note that lifting
social outcomes are maximal elements of this graph.
Proposition 3.9. Suppose z is an u-local optimum. Then the following two
conditions are satisfied:
• for each irreducible component Ti 6= TMAX, each maximal element of
the graph constructed above (considered as a social outcome) is lifting
with respect to an objects scheme A such that Φ(z, A) is empty;
• for TMAX, the u-local optimum z is the only maximal element of the
graph constructed above.
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Proof. Let y ∈ Ti 6= TMAX be a maximal element of the graph constructed
above. By virtue of Proposition 3.7-(i) there exists a domination path
y = y0 ≺ y1 ≺ · · · ≺ yd = y
′
from y to a lifting social outcome y′ ∈ Ti. Since y is a maximal element, the
set BGzy ∩ Ti is empty and hence d is zero. Therefore, y
′ equals y and hence
y is lifting.
Similarly, let y ∈ TMAX be a maximal element of the graph constructed
above. The set BGzy ∩ TMAX is empty and hence the whole BG
z
y is empty.
Since y belongs to Ψ(z), we obtain that y equals z. This concludes the
proof.
Proposition 3.10. The score of a local optimum is at least
∑n
j=1(mj − 1).
Proof. By virtue of Theorem 2.5 each local optimum z must dominate the∑n
j=1(mj − 1) social outcomes w with dp(w, z) = 1.
Remark 3.11. The bound in the proposition above seems to be quite weak,
mainly because in the classical social choice framework the score of an opti-
mum is M −1. However, the bound above is attained. Namely, let ≻ be any
social rule such that z ≻ x for each social outcome x with dp(x, z) = 1, and
z ≺ x for each social outcome x with dp(x, z) > 1. For ≻ the social outcome
z is free (and hence is a local optimum for an objects scheme Az) and has
score
∑n
j=1(mj − 1).
Moreover, there can be also global optima with score
∑n
j=1(mj−1). This
can be easily obtained by suitably choosing the arcs of the social rule ≻ that
are not fixed above, so we leave it to the reader.
4 Probability
As above, let X be the set of possible social outcomes given by a bundle
of features F = {f1, . . . , fn} such that fi belongs to {0, 1, 2, . . . , mi − 1}
for i = 1, . . . , n. Throughout this section, we will suppose (without loss of
generality) that the mi’s are ordered decreasingly:
m1 > m2 > · · · > mn.
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Theorem 4.1. In the hypothesis above, any given social rule ≻ on X has at
most
n∏
i=2
mi
local optima, and this bound is attained.
Proof. The proof of the bound is by induction on the number n of features.
If n is 1, there is at most one local optimum (one when the social rule
is transitive, zero otherwise). Suppose now the statement true for n and
suppose ≻ is defined on social oucomes with n + 1 features. If j belongs
to {0, 1, 2, . . . , mn+1 − 1} for the (n + 1)-th feature, we define the subspace
V jn = {(y1, . . . , yn+1) ∈ R
n+1 | yn+1 = j −
1
2
} of Rn+1 having dimension
n. Let Xjn be the set of all the social outcomes in X whose corresponding
chambers intersect V jn . Then, for any j ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , mn+1 − 1}, X
j
n is
given by n features taking m1 > · · · > mn values. By induction, X
j
n has at
most
∏n
i=2mi local optima for any j ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , mn+1 − 1}. Moreover,
by definition of local optimum, if x ∈ X is a local optimum for the social
rule ≻, it is a local optimum also for the social rule ≻j induced by ≻ on
Xjn. Therefore, the number of local optima in X is at most the sum over
j ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , mn+1 − 1} of the maximum number of local optima of each
Xjn, i.e.
∏n+1
i=2 mi. This concludes the proof of the bound.
In order to prove that the bound is attained, we will prove the following
slightly stronger statement.
Assertion. In the hypothesis above, there exist at least mn social rules
with exactly
∏n
i=2mi local optima and such that for any two of them the
sets of local optima are disjoint.
The proof of the assertion is by induction on the number n of features.
If n is 1, any transitive social rule has one local optimum (the global one).
Moreover, for any social outcome z there is a transitive social rule with z as
local optimum. Since there are m1 social outcomes, we obtain the thesis.
Suppose now the statement true for n and letX be a set of social outcomes
with n + 1 features. As above, we define the subspace V jn and the set X
j
n,
for j = 0, . . . , mn+1 − 1. By induction, on each X
j
n we can define a social
rule ≻j with exactly
∏n
i=2mi local optima and such that the local optima in
two different Xjn are separated by at least two features (one of which being
fn+1), because mn+1 6 mn holds. More precisely, if v1 · · · vnj ∈ X
j
n is a local
optimum for ≻j and v′1 · · · v
′
nj
′ ∈ Xj
′
n is a local optimum for ≻
j′ with j 6= j′,
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then there exists a feature fk different from fn+1 such that vk differs from
v′k. Therefore, there exists a social rule ≻ on X that satisfies the following
properties:
• ≻ equals ≻j on Xjn,
• if x ∈ Xjn is a local optimum for ≻
j then x ≻ y for all y ∈ X \Xjn such
that dp(x, y) = 1.
This social rule has
∏n+1
i=2 mi free social outcomes, which are local optima by
virtue of Theorem 2.5; therefore, it is one of the social rules we are looking
for.
The other ones can be obtained by shifting the pairing of X∗n’s and ≻
∗’s.
More precisely, for l = 0, . . . , mn+1 − 1, the l-th social rule ≻l is defined by
choosing on Xjn the social rule ≻
h, where h is the remainder of the division
of j + l by n + 1, and by repeating the procedure above. These mn+1 social
rules on X have
∏n+1
i=2 mi local optima each. Moreover, if v1 · · · vnj ∈ X
j
n is
a local optimum for ≻l and v
′
1 · · · v
′
nj
′ ∈ Xj
′
n is a local optimum for ≻l′ with
l 6= l′, then by construction either j differs from j′ or v1 · · · vn differs from
v′1 · · · v
′
n. This concludes the proof of the assertion, and hence the proof of
the theorem.
Social rules with a fixed number of free social outcomes in the two-
feature case We compute the number of social rules with two features and
a fixed number of free social outcomes. Note that, by virtue of Theorem 4.1,
there are at most m2 free social outcomes. Let us call ek the number of social
rules with k free social outcomes. We will count the graphs corresponding to
the social rules.
Call V1 (resp. V2) the set of values of the first (resp. second) feature of the
k free social outcomes. Since two free social outcomes are separated by both
features, we have #V1 = #V2 = k. There are
(
m1
k
)
(resp.
(
m2
k
)
) possibilities
for choosing V1 (resp. V2). Moreover, in V1 × V2, the k free social outcomes
can be chosen in k! ways.
Suppose now that the position of the k free social outcomes is fixed. For
each k = 0, 1, . . . , m2, we compute an integer ak which is related to (but dif-
ferent from) ek, because we allow some repetitions in the counting process.
Since the k social outcomes are free, each of them dominates all the social out-
comes that are separated from it by one feature. Therefore, k (m1 +m2 − 2)
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arcs are fixed. If k equals m2, the other
(
m1m2
2
)
−m2 (m1 +m2 − 2) arcs are
unrestricted and hence we obtain
em2 =
(
m1
m2
)(
m2
m2
)
m2!2
(m1m22 )−m2(m1+m2−2)
graphs. For general k, the other
(
m1m2
2
)
−k (m1 +m2 − 2) arcs are not unre-
stricted, because there should not be any other free social outcome. However,
if we leave them unrestricted, we obtain
ak =
(
m1
k
)(
m2
k
)
k!2(
m1m2
2 )−k(m1+m2−2)
graphs. In this process we count each graph with k + l free social outcomes(
k+l
k
)
times and hence we obtain the system of linear equations
∑m2
k=0
(
k
0
)
ek = a0∑m2
k=1
(
k
1
)
ek = a1
...
em2−1 +m2em2 = am2−1
em2 = am2 .
By (partially) solving this system, we obtain the recursive formula
ek = ak −
m2∑
l=k+1
(
l
k
)
el
for computing the number of social rules with two features and k free social
outcomes. An explicit formula can be given. If S is a subset of {k, k +
1, . . . , i}, we denote by Prod(S) the product
#S−1∏
j=1
(
sj+1
sj
)
,
where the s∗’s are the elements of S ordered increasingly (s1 < s2 < · · · <
s#S). The number of social rules with two features and k free social outcomes
is
ek =
m2∑
i=k
 ∑
S⊆{k,k+1,...,i}
k,i∈S
(−1)#S+1 Prod(S)
 ai.
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free social values for the features
outcomes (2,2) (3,3) (5,5) (10,10)
0 .125 .5063476563 .9053598846 .9996185892
1 .75 .4262695313 .0916594645 .0003813519
2 .125 .0659179688 .0029453066 .0000000589
3 . .0014648438 .0000352051 < 10−10
4 . . .0000001392 < 10−10
5 . . .0000000001 < 10−10
6 . . . < 10−10
7 . . . < 10−10
8 . . . < 10−10
9 . . . < 10−10
10 . . . < 10−10
Table 3: The probability that a social rule with two features has a fixed
number of free social outcomes.
The proof of this formula, by means of a recursion fromm2 to zero, is straight-
forward, so we leave it to the reader.
With an effort one may carry out a similar argument to compute the
number of social rules with three features and a fixed number of free social
outcomes, but a general formula seems to be unfeasible with this technique.
An interesting issue is to study the probability P(m1,...,mn)(k) that a social
rule has k free social outcomes. For the social rules with two features, this
quotient is
P(m1,m2)(k) =
ek
2(
m1m2
2 )
.
In Table 3 we have computed it for small values of m1 and m2.
Decidability and manipulability in the new framework In the clas-
sical social choice framework a given social outcome z is an optimum if and
only if it dominates all the other social outcomes. Therefore, the probability
P (z) that a given social outcome z is an optimum for a social rule on M
social outcomes is given by the quotient between the number of graphs with
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M − 1 nodes and the number of graphs with M nodes, i.e.
P (z) =
2(
M−1
2 )
2(
M
2 )
=
1
2M−1
.
In Marengo and the second author’s model, global optima play the role
of optima in the classical framework, but also a local optimum can be an
optimum if the agents vote starting from a particular social outcome. The
probability P (z) for a given social outcome z to be a local optimum is given
by the quotient between the number of the graphs with M nodes and with∑n
i=1mi − n fixed arcs, and the number of all the graphs with M nodes, i.e.
P (z) =
2(
M
2 )−(
∑n
i=1mi−n)
2(
M
2 )
=
1
2
∑n
i=1mi−n
=
2n
2
∑n
i=1mi
.
It is clear that, if n is greater than 1, the probability for z to be a local
optimum is far greater than that to be an optimum in the classical framework.
Therefore, we define a function F : N3 −→ Q depending on n, M =
∏n
i=1mi
and σ =
∑n
i=1mi, defined to be the quotient between the probability of a
social outcome to be an optimum in the classical framework and that to be
a local optimum in the new model,
F (n,M, σ) =
2n
2
∑n
i=1mi
2M−1 = 2n+M−(σ−1).
Remark 4.2. The inequality
F (n,M, σ) > 1
holds. However, the inequality becomes strict,
F (n,M, σ) > 1,
if and only if n is greater than 1.
The study of the function F seems to be very important in the social
choice context. Indeed, it gives an idea about the decidability and the ma-
nipulability of choice in the new model with respect to the old one. We
note that, for example, if mi is 2 for i = 1, . . . , n, there is a high probability
for a social outcome to be a local optimum, while this probability strongly
decreases when the values of the mi’s increase. However, the value of F is
far greater than 1 even if the mi’s are greater than 2. We think that this
function F is a measure of the power of this new approach in social decision
theory.
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5 The algorithm
We will describe here an algorithm to compute the universal basin of attrac-
tion of a social outcome z of a social rule ≺. It finds also the sets Ezi defined
at the end of Section 2. Therefore it obtains also the deepness of each social
outcome with respect to z and the u-deepness of z.
The algorithm ComputeUniversalBasin works as follows. The pseu-
docode is shown in Algorithm 1.
Step 1. Consider the set X of all social outcomes. Start with the empty sets
Ezi for i ∈ N (we will need only a finite number of them). Eventually,
the universal basin of attraction Ψ(z) will be
⋃
iE
z
i .
Step 2. Compute the irreducible components T∗ of the graph corresponding
to the social rule ≺. Let h be the integer such that z ∈ Th. Remove
from X all the social outcomes that are in Tj for all j > h.
Step 3. If Hw,z is made up of only one feature for some w ≻ z, then z is not
a local optimum and hence Ezi is empty for all i ∈ N: go to Step 6.
Otherwise, z is a local optimum: hence add z to Ez0 and remove it
from X .
Step 4. Find all the social outcomes y ∈ X such that
y ≺ z,
Hz,y 6⊇ Hw,z for all w ≻ z.
Add these y’s to Ez1 and remove them from X . Go to Step 5 with
i = 1.
Step 5. For each yi ∈ E
z
i do the following steps.
• Find all the social outcomes yi+1 ∈ X such that
yi+1 ≺ yi,
Hyi,yi+1 6⊇ Hw,yi for all w ≻ yi,
Hyi,yi+1 6⊇ Hw,z for all w ≻ z.
• Add these yi+1’s to E
z
i+1 and remove them from X .
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Input: A social rule ≻ and a social outcome z
Output: The non-void Ezi ’s and hence the universal basin of attraction Ψ(z) =
⋃
iE
z
i .
1: Initialize X := the set of all social outcomes
2: for i = 0 to M do
3: Initialize Ezi := ∅
4: end for
5: Compute the irreducible components Tj
6: Let h := the integer such that z ∈ Th
7: X := X \
⋃
j>h Tj
8: if ∃w ≻ z such that #Hw,z = 1 then [z is not a local optimum]
9: return ∅ [Ezj = ∅ ∀j = 0, . . . ,M ]
10: else [z is a local optimum]
11: Ez0 := {z}
12: X := X \ {z}
13: Compute B(z) := {y ∈ X |y ≺ z, Hz,y 6⊇ Hw,z ∀w ≻ z}
14: Ez1 := B(z)
15: X := X \B(z)
16: return Recursion(1)
17: end if
18:
19: where Recursion is the following function
Input: An integer i
Output: The non-void Ezi ’s and hence the universal basin of attraction Ψ(z) =
⋃
iE
z
i .
20: for all yi ∈ E
z
i do
21: Compute B(yi) := {yi+1 ∈ X |yi+1 ≺ yi, Hyi,yi+1 6⊇ Hw,yi ∀w ≻ yi,
Hyi,yi+1 6⊇ Hw,z ∀w ≻ z}
22: Ezi+1 := E
z
i+1 ∪B(yi)
23: X := X \B(yi)
24: end for
25: if Ezi+1 = ∅ then [the universal basin of attraction has been computed]
26: return Ezj for all j = 0, . . . , i [E
z
j = ∅ ∀j > i]
27: else [the next step]
28: return Recursion(i + 1)
29: end if
Algorithm 1: Pseudocode for the algorithm to compute the universal basin of
attraction of a social outcome z of a social rule ≺. (All sets are implemented
as ordered lists.)
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• If Ezi+1 is empty, go to Step 6; otherwise, repeat Step 5 with i
incremented by 1.
Step 6. The universal basin of attraction Ψ(z) is the union of the Ezi ’s (only
a finite number of them being non-empty).
Theorem 5.1. If the social rule ≺ is defined on M social outcomes and a so-
cial outcome z is given, the algorithm ComputeUniversalBasin computes
the universal basin of attraction of z in O(M3 logM) time.
Proof. We start by proving that the algorithm comes to an end. The algo-
rithm is tail-recursive, hence we need to prove that the recursive function
Recursion (Line 19) does not give rise to an infinite loop. Each time Re-
cursion is called, it may move elements (those belonging to B(yi) for each
yi ∈ E
z
i ) from X to E
z
i+1 (Lines 20-24), and then it either stops Compute-
UniversalBasin (Line 26) or calls itself with i incremented by 1 (Line 28).
Since X is finite, there is a minimal ı¯ ∈ N such that all B(yı¯)’s (and hence
Ezı¯+1) are empty. When Recursion(¯ı) is called, it moves no element from
X to Ezı¯+1, and then it stops ComputeUniversalBasin (Line 26).
We now prove that the algorithm is correct. By virtue of Theorem 2.11,
we have that the universal basin of attraction Ψ(z) is
⋃
iE
z
i . By means of
Proposition 3.1, we know that all the social outcomes that are in Tj for all
j > h cannot be in the universal basin of attraction of z, and hence they can
be removed from the set X of social outcomes that may be in the universal
basin of attraction (Lines 5-7). If z is not a local optimum, all Ezi ’s are empty;
in this case the condition in Line 8 is true (in virtue of Theorem 2.5) and
hence the output is the empty set (Line 9). Otherwise, if z is a local optimum,
Ez0 is {z} and E
z
1 is not empty (see the end of Section 2); in this case E
z
0
and Ez1 are computed, and their elements are removed from X (Lines 11-15).
Then Recursion is called and Ez2 is computed by means of the conditions
of the end of Section 2 (Lines 20-24). If Ez2 is empty (Line 25), the universal
basin of attraction has been computed (see the end of Section 2) and the
output is Ez0 , E
z
1 and E
z
2 (Line 26). Otherwise, Recursion is called again
and Ez3 is computed. An easy recursive argument now concludes the proof
of the correctness of the algorithm.
We eventually show that our algorithm has run-time O(M3 logM). First
of all, we note that if x and y are social outcomes, Hx,y has O(logM) elements
at most and hence it can be computed in O(logM) time. Moreover, if x¯ and
y¯ are other social outcomes, the test Hx,y 6⊇ Hx¯,y¯ can also be performed
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in O(logM) time. We denote by Mi the cardinality of the set E
z
i for i =
0, . . . ,M .
The initializations in Lines 1-4 are done in O(M) time. The computation
of the irreducible components of Line 5 is done in O(M2) time (see Sec-
tion 1.2). Lines 6 and 7 are executed in O(M) time. The condition in Line 8
can be checked in O(M logM) time. Line 13 is executed in O(M2 logM)
time and hence the same holds for Lines 11-15.
We will now take the call of Recursion(i) into account. Line 21 is
executed in O(M2 logM) time, while Lines 22 and 23 are executed in O(M)
time. These three lines are executed for all yi ∈ E
z
i , i.e. Mi times. The
condition in Line 25 is checked in O(1) time, and Line 26 is executed in O(M)
time. Therefore, the call of Recursion(i) has run-time O(MiM
2 logM).
Summing the run-time O(M2 logM) of Lines 1-17 and the run-times of all
calls of Recursion, we obtain
M2 logM +
M∑
i=1
MiM
2 logM =
(
M∑
i=0
Mi
)
M2 logM ∼M3 logM.
This concludes the proof.
Remark 5.2. The calculus of irreducible components (Step 2) is not neces-
sary, but it can make the computation faster if there are many social outcomes
in the irreducible components that dominate z.
Remark 5.3. In Step 5 the social outcomes with deepness i+1 with respect
to z are found. Therefore, the number of calls of the recursive function
Recursion is the u-deepness of z.
Remark 5.4. A (faster) simplification of the algorithm described above can
be easily constructed to check whether a social outcome is in the universal
basin of attraction of another one.
FOSoR The first author has used Algorithm 1 to write the computer pro-
gram FOSoR [1]. It reads a social rule and can
• compute the universal basin of attractions,
• check whether a social outcome is a local (or an u-local) optimum,
• check whether a social outcome is in the universal basin of attraction
of another one,
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• check whether there is a local (or an u-local) optimum,
• find the number of local (or u-local) optima,
• find an objects scheme (if there is any) through which there is a maxi-
mal dominating path starting from a social outcome and ending up in
another one,
• find the deepnesses and the u-deepnesses.
6 Numerical examples
We give here some numerical results on the numbers of local and u-local
optima of social rules. In order to compute these results the first author has
written the computer program FOSoRStat [2], which is based on Algorithm 1.
It reads the number of values of each feature and the number of random social
rules to check. It works as follows:
• it repeatedly
– creates a random social rule,
– computes the number of local (and u-local) optima;
• it computes the percentages and collects the results.
We have shown the results for local (resp. u-local) optima in the case when
each feature can assume two values in Table 4 (resp. Table 5). This case is
interesting because it represents the binary choice (i.e. yes/no, true/false,
for/against features). We have shown the results for local (resp. u-local)
optima in some other cases in Table 6 (resp. Table 7). Note that the relative
frequencies in the cases with two features are consistent with the probabilities
(computed in Section 4) that a social rule with two features has a fixed
number of free social outcomes, see Table 3.
Eventually, we compare Marengo and the second author’s model with the
classical one. Note that in the classical model there can be only one optimum
and that the probability P (M) that a social rule with M social outcomes has
an optimum equalsM times the probability that a given social outcome is an
optimum, i.e. M
2M−1
. In Table 8 we have computed this probability for small
values of M .
35
local number of features
optima 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0 . .125298 .234797 .296109 .328291 .346168 .359183 .363905
1 1 .749722 .544492 .451488 .410650 .390143 .380017 .375250
2 . .124980 .206551 .210998 .201968 .194522 .188194 .185849
3 . . .013679 .038372 .050962 .056757 .058031 .058879
4 . . .000481 .002934 .007427 .010837 .012366 .013346
5 . . . .000097 .000657 .001444 .001964 .002385
6 . . . .000002 .000043 .000120 .000220 .000341
7 . . . . .000002 .000009 .000024 .000041
8 . . . . . . .000001 .000003
9 . . . . . . . .000001
Table 4: Relative frequencies of social rules with a fixed number of local
optima (over 106 social rules): cases of two values for each feature.
u-local number of features
optima 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0 . .270704 .353896 .377606 .377254 .374337 .369871
1 1 .716457 .608455 .551384 .511074 .472559 .438681
2 . .012335 .036169 .066967 .101588 .133080 .157869
3 . .000504 .001460 .003919 .009610 .018503 .029815
4 . . .000020 .000123 .000456 .001444 .003468
5 . . . .000001 .000016 .000074 .000279
6 . . . . .000002 .000003 .000017
Table 5: Relative frequencies of social rules with a fixed number of u-local
optima (over 106 social rules): cases of two values for each feature.
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local values for the features
optima (3,3) (3,3,3) (3,3,3,3) (5,5) (10,10)
0 .5065899 .6392066 .7246560 .905331876 .9996083
1 .4260296 .3042338 .2376727 .091717916 .0003917
2 .0659261 .0522738 .0345455 .002915423 .
3 .0014544 .0041184 .0029567 .000034649 .
4 . .0001637 .0001618 .000000136 .
5 . .0000037 .0000071 . .
6 . . .0000002 . .
repetitions 107 107 107 109 107
Table 6: Relative frequencies of social rules with a fixed number of local
optima (the number of repetitions is indicated in the last line): other cases.
u-local values for the features
optima (3,3) (3,3,3) (3,3,3,3) (5,5) (10,10)
0 .8020871 .9699638 .9966669 .999923702 1
1 .1979129 .0300356 .0033330 .000076298 .
2 . .0000006 . . .
repetitions 107 107 107 109 107
Table 7: Relative frequencies of social rules with a fixed number of u-local
optima (the number of repetitions is indicated in the last line): other cases.
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M P (M) M P (M) M P (M) M P (M)
2 1 6 .1875 10 .019531 14 .001709
3 .75 7 .109375 11 .010742 15 .000915
4 .5 8 .0625 12 .005859 16 .000488
5 .3125 9 .035156 13 .003174 17 .000259
Table 8: The probability that a social rule has an optimum in the classical
model.
7 An example
In this section we will describe in detail an example in which all kinds of
optima appear. It is so small that we can deal with it by hands. The number
of features is three, assuming two values each. The set X is made up of eight
social outcomes: v1v2v3 with v∗ = 0, 1. The social rule is any ≻ with
000 ≻ 100, 000 ≻ 010, 000 ≻ 001, 000 ≻ 101, 000 ≻ 011,
110 ≻ 000, 110 ≻ 100, 110 ≻ 010, 110 ≻ 101, 110 ≻ 011,
101 ≻ 100, 101 ≻ 001, 101 ≻ 111,
011 ≻ 010, 011 ≻ 001, 011 ≻ 101, 011 ≻ 111,
111 ≻ 110,
where the ten preferences that are not defined are arbitrary. The preferences
are shown in Figure 4, where we have disposed the social outcomes as the
vertices of a cube.
We will show that the social outcome g = 011 is a global optimum, that
the social outcome u = 000 is an u-local optimum but not a global optimum,
and that the social outcome l = 101 is a local optimum but not an u-local
optimum.
The proof that g is a global optimum for the objects scheme Ag =
{{H1,0, H2,0}, {H3,0}} is straightforward, so we leave it to the reader.
In order to prove that u is an u-local optimum, we note that we have
Ψ(u, ({H2,0, H3,0}, {H1,0}, {H3,0})) = X \ {l}
and
l ∈ Ψ(u, ({H1,0, H3,0}, {H2,0})).
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Figure 4: A social rule with a global optimum, an u-local optimum and a
local optimum. (The ten preferences that are not drawn are arbitrary.)
Therefore, Ψ(u) is the whole X , and u is an u-local optimum. We will
now prove that u is not a global optimum. Suppose by way of contradic-
tion that u is a global optimum for an agenda α of an objects scheme A,
i.e. Ψ(u, (A1, . . . ,Ak)) = X (where Ai = Aj is allowed). Since u is a local op-
timum for A (see Remark 2.3), the objects {H1,0, H2,0} and {H1,0, H2,0, H3,0}
cannot belong to A. Since l (resp. g) belongs to Ψ(u, (A1, . . . ,Ak)), the ob-
ject {H1,0, H3,0} (resp. {H2,0, H3,0}) belongs to A and hence {H1,0, H3,0} = Ai
and {H2,0, H3,0} = Aj for some i and j in {1, . . . , k}. Since l (resp. g) belongs
to Ψ(u, (A1, . . . ,Ak)), we have i < j (resp. j < i). This is a contradiction
and hence u is not a global optimum.
Since l is free, it is a local optimum for some objects scheme. We
will now prove that l is not an u-local optimum (then, by virtue of Re-
mark 2.9, it is not a global optimum, either). If A is an objects scheme such
that Φ(l, A) is empty, the objects {H1,0, H2,0}, {H1,0, H3,0}, {H2,0, H3,0} and
{H1,0, H2,0, H3,0} cannot belong toA. Therefore, A is {{H1,0}, {H2,0}, {H3,0}}
and hence Ψ(l) equals Ψ(l, {{H1,0}, {H2,0}, {H3,0}}). Since u does not be-
long to the last-mentioned basin of attraction, the social outcome l is not an
u-local optimum.
Remark 7.1. The social rule ≻ is the smallest one that has a global opti-
mum, an u-local optimum and a local optimum. Indeed, a social rule with
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less than eight nodes can have at most two features; if there is only one
feature, there is at most one local optimum (which is actually a global opti-
mum); if there are two features assuming m1 and m2 values (the smaller of
which is 2), by virtue of Theorem 4.1 there are at most min{m1, m2} = 2
local optima.
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